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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78A-4-103(j). This appeal arises from the Order on Objection to Judgment and
Amended Judgment entered by the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Washington
County, Utah in the case of Melvyn Bircoll and Janine Bircoll v. Southwest Marble &
Granite, Inc, 050501733.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES and STANDARDS OF REVIEW
FIRST ISSUE1: Whether the trial court appropriately acted within its discretion
when it awarded Appellants an award of attorney’s fees which corresponded to the claims
actually prevailed upon by the Appellants at trial, but which was less than the total amount
requested by Appellants?
Standard of Review: The trial court has broad discretion in determining what
constitutes a reasonable fee, and we will consider that determination against an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. (Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988)).
SECOND ISSUE: Whether the trial court’s reduced award of attorney’s fees is
against public policy or inequitable?

1

The Appellants in the instant case do not comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure in that the Brief of the Appellants does not contain the required
statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of
appellate review with supporting authority; and citation to the record showing that the
issue was preserved in the trial court; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an
issue not preserved in the trial court. (URAP Rule 24(a)(5) 2009). Nevertheless, the
Appellee herein states the issues on appeal with the corresponding standards of review.

Standard of Review: The trial court has broad discretion in determining what
constitutes a reasonable fee, and we will consider that determination against an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. (Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988).
STATUTORY PROVISION
The following is the statutory provision referenced in the present appeal:
UCA §38-1-18(1):
(1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled
to recover a reasonable attorneys fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed
as costs in the action.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the present case, Plaintiffs, Dr. Melvin Bircoll and Janine Bircoll (hereinafter
“Appellants”) hired Southwest Marble & Granite, Inc (hereinafter “Appellee”) to fabricate
and install counter-tops in their newly-constructed residence. (Record at 71, ¶25). The
records and notes in the Appellee’s project file indicated that the correct counter-tops were
installed in the residence of the Appellants. (Record at 74, ¶60). However, after the
installation, Appellants expressed dissatisfaction to employees of the Appellee with the
counter-tops installed in the master-bathroom. (Record at 72, ¶¶34-35). The Appellants
alleged that these counter-tops were completely and entirely wrong; including the wrong
thickness, the wrong color of the stone and the wrong edge of the countertops installed in
the master bathroom. (Record at 72 ¶43 of Findings).
2

The Appellee believed that the counter-tops were of the same color, thickness and
edge which had been ordered by the Appellants. The Appellee sent invoices for payment
to the Appellees in the amount of the contracted price of $2,182. (Record at 70, ¶20).
However, Appellants refused to pay anything to the Appellee for the master-bathroom
counter-tops. (Record at 72, ¶43). The Appellee asked Appellants if they were willing to
pay just $900.00 for the bathroom counter-tops; however, Appellants indicated that they
were not interested in paying $900.00 for the counter-tops. (Id.)
The Appellants conveyed the message to the Appellee that “the countertops were of
no value to them and that the Bircolls [Appellants] intended to initiate a lawsuit against
Southwest Marble [Appellee] for these countertops. (Record at 74, ¶60). Appellants
threatened litigation and demanded “that the invoice be written down to zero” which gave
the Appellee the impression that Appellants did not have any willingness to discuss this
matter and that they were unwilling for any result except a total reduction of the billing.
However, from the project file, it appeared that the countertops installed were according to
the specifications of color, edge and thickness.” (Record at 74, ¶60 of Findings).
Subsequently, in an effort to protect its lien rights and pursuant to UCA §38-1-7,
the Appellee timely filed a mechanic’s lien upon Appellant’s real property in the amount
of $2,182. (Record at 74 ¶62 of Findings). Thereafter, Appellants filed a complaint
against Appellee in which they allege four (4) separate causes of action; namely, (1)
Abuse of Lien, (2) Breach of Contract, (3) Breach of Modification Agreement, and (4)
Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. (Record at 1-7). In response,
3

Appellee filed its Answer along with a counter-claim for (1) Breach of Contract, (2)
Unjust Enrichment, and (3) Foreclosure of Lien. (Record at 11-16).
After the bench trial had concluded, the Trial Court awarded the Appellants the
difference between the cost of a new countertop and the amount Appellants should have
paid for the countertop installed, two sinks, replacement of back-splash, plumbing work
and repainting for a total of $1,565.00. (Record at 76, ¶72 of Findings). The Trial Court
concluded that Appellee had not installed countertops of the wrong thickness. (Record at
77, ¶6 of Conclusions). The Appellants did not prevail on their allegations that the
countertops were the wrong color of stone or edge. (Record at 132). The Trial Court
correctly noted that the Appellants had expended “a considerable amount of time and
energy” on the unsuccessful claim that the color of the stone was not “Juperana
Bordeaux.” (Id).
The Trial Court concluded that the Appellants were excused from paying the
contracted price of $2,182 due to the countertops being the wrong thickness and
subsequently, Appellee was not entitled to maintain its mechanic’s lien. (Record at 78, ¶¶9
and 17). The Trial Court then concluded that the Appellants were entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees to be determined at a later date. (Record at 79, ¶ 20).
The Trial Court issued a written opinion with supporting caselaw which concluded
that since the Appellants had not prevailed on three of their four causes of action (Abuse
of Lien, Breach of Modification Agreement and Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Faith
Dealings) that the Trial Court would not award entire amount of attorney’s fees claimed by
4

the Appellants. (Record at 129-133). After considering the factors outlined in several
Utah cases, the Trial Court awarded the Appellants $1,565.00 in principal along with
$4,310.88 in attorney’s fees and $369.00 in costs. (Record at 132).
Subsequently, the Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal and allege that the Trial
Court should have awarded them $17,243.50 in attorney’s fees, being the total amount
claimed to be expended on all four of their causes of action. (Brief of Appellants at 2).
The Appellants allege on appeal that the Trial Court’s award of attorney’s fees is “against
public policy” and “inequitable.” (Id at 3-8).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On the 23rd of January, 2008, the parties came before the Trial Court for bench trial
on Plaintiffs’/Appellants’ Complaint and Defendant’s/Appellee’s Counter-Claim.
(Record at 66-67).

2.

The total money judgment awarded in the favor of the Appellants on their Second
Cause of Action: Breach of Contract claim was $1,565.00 plus attorney’s fees and
costs to be determined by the Trial Court. (Record at 76, ¶72).

3.

The Appellants did not prevail on three (3) of their four (4) causes of action.
(Record at 132).

4.

On the 22nd of April, 2008, Appellee filed its Objection to Form and Content of
Proposed Order and Judgment. (Record at 83-90).
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5.

On the 28th of April, 2008, Appellants submitted a request for attorney’s fees and
costs in the amount of $17,243.50 in the form of an Affidavit of Counsel and
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements. (Record at 91-95).

6.

The Appellants did not separate out nor categorize the attorney’s fees and costs
allegedly expended for the successful claim for which they may be entitled to
reasonable attorney’s fees and the unsuccessful claims for which there would not
be an entitlement to attorney’s fees. (Record at 131-132).

7.

The amount of attorney’s fees claimed by the Appellants was more than one
thousand one hundred percent (1100%) of the actual damages awarded by the Trial
Court. (Cf. Record at 76, ¶72 with Record 91-95).

8.

That Trial Court concluded that since the Appellee did not prevail on its counterclaim for Breach of Contract, Appellee could not, therefore, maintain a lien for the
contract price against the real property of the Appellants. (Record at 80, ¶ 21).

9.

That while the Trial Court concluded that the Appellee could not maintain its lien,
the Trial Court specifically found and concluded that the lien was not an abusive
lien under UCA §38-1-25. (Id.)

10.

That the Trial Court specifically concluded that the Appellee had not caused the
lien to be filed with the “intent to cloud title,” or, “to exact more than [Appellee]
believed was due, or to gain any unjustified advantage or benefit.” (Id.)

11.

That the Trial Court also concluded that although the Appellants found the
countertops to be “a disappointment”, the Trial Court did not “find bad faith or an
6

improper purpose in [Appellee’s] disagreement in valuation and its desire to be paid
for services and materials actually provided ... and ... “[Appellants’] claim for abuse
of lien right fails.” (Record at 80, ¶¶ 22-23).
12.

On the 7th of May, 2008, the Order and Judgment was entered. (Record at 102-104).
However, the Court entered this Judgment under the mistaken belief that there was
not any Objection to Form of the proposed judgment filed by the Appellee. (Cf
Record 83-90). The Trial Court had been experiencing a heavy volume and
associated problems at this time period. (See e.g., Record at 148-150).

13.

On the 29th day of September, 2008, the final judgment entitled “Order on
Objection to Judgment and Amended Judgment”, the subject matter of this appeal,
was entered which provides for a money judgment in favor of the Appellants for
$1,565.00 in damages plus $369.00 in costs and $4,310.88 in attorney’s fees.
(Record at 129-134).

14.

On the 26th of January, 2009, an Order Granting Plaintiff’s [Appellants’] Extension
to File Appeal was entered. (Record at 163-164).

15.

On the 9th of February, 2009, a Notice of Appeal was filed by the Appellants.
(Record at 165-166).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In the present case, Appellants prevailed on their breach of contract claim and the

court determined that since the Appellee had not prevailed on its breach of contract claim,
then the mechanic’s lien could not be maintained nor foreclosed. (Record at 129-134).
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Appellants made a claim for attorney’s fees which exceeds the amount of recovery by
more than 1100%. In sum, the Appellants allege that they were obliged to logged one
hundred five (105) hours of attorney time, more than $17,243.50 in time and costs, over a
claim of only $2,182. Although the Appellants pursued three other claims, Abuse of Lien,
Breach of Modification of Agreement and Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing, Appellants only prevailed in their Breach of [Oral] Contract claim.
In the post-trial proceedings, the Trial Court exercised it broad discretion in
fashioning an award of attorney’s fees which it believed was appropriate and reasonable.
The adjudication of reasonableness should be upheld in this case since there was not any
abuse of discretion, violation of public policy or inequity.
Moreover, as a procedural matter on appeal, the Appellants fail to marshal the
evidence, fail to provide an adequate record to support their allegations on appeal, fail to
provide supporting legal authority, and fail to follow the proper documentation and format
of the briefing requirements. Appellants claim they because they are filing this brief pro
se that they should be excused from compliance. It is interesting to note that on appeal
that Mr. Bircoll refers to himself as “Mel” when during the trial proceedings there was
immediate offense taken by the Appellants when Melvyn Bircoll was inadvertently
referred to as “Mr. Bircoll” instead of “Dr. Bircoll”; with the Appellants insisting on the
use of the latter title. It was apparent that the title was of importance to emphasize his
erudition and accomplishments. This does not appear to be the same posturing on appeal.
Additionally, during the appellate mediation program, the Appellants were represented by
8

their attorney daughter who acted as their representative to make their arguments with
referrence to specific caselaw.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANTS’ BRIEF SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT FAILS TO
COMPLY WITH THE FORM AND MARSHALING REQUIREMENTS.
Even though Appellants are pro se appellants, they must comply with the Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure. (Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶4 (the pro se appellant failed
to follow the appellate rules, failed to identify flaws in the district court’s order to be
reversed, did not provide portions of the record central to appeal, and failed to show that
there was not a reasonable basis in the record to support the district court’s holdings)).
The Brief of the Appellants fails to identify flaws in the district court ruling, does not
provide citations to the record, fails to provide supporting legal authority, and fails to
demonstrate that there was not a reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions of the
Trial Court.
The Brief of the Appellants fails to comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. (Utah R. App. P. 24). Appellants fail to provide standards of review
with supporting authority, citations to the record, constitutional provisions, statutes, and
rules whose interpretation is determinative on appeal, a table of authorities, and supporting
legal authority which supports the conclusions of the Appellants that the award of
attorneys fees was “against public policy” and “inequitable”.
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The Appellants have not taken issue with the findings of the Trial Court and have
failed to provide a transcript of the hearing held on Appellee’s Objection to Form and
Content of Proposed Order and Judgment submitted by the Appellants. Therefore, it
should be assumed, as a matter of law, that the trial court's decision to award less than the
amount of attorney’s fees requested by Appellants was not erroneous. (See, Jolivet v.
Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1033, 110 S.Ct. 751, 107
L.Ed.2d 767 (1990) (court assumes regularity of proceedings below where appellant fails
to provide adequate record on appeal) (citing State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah
1986); State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985); State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263,
1267 (Utah 1982)). See also, State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 253 (Utah 1983) (court
assumes correctness of judgment below if counsel on appeal fails to cite to record); State
v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982) (court assumes correctness of findings when
defendant's brief contained nothing more than defendant's version of facts found by trial
court). These failures in the briefing and marshaling requirements is sufficient to base a
decision to decline to reach issues on appeal. (State v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah
App. 1991); Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 612-13 (Utah 1987)).
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
AWARDED LESS THAN THE FULL AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS TO
APPELLANTS WHEN APPELLANTS FAILED TO PREVAIL ON THREE
OF THEIR FOUR CAUSES OF ACTION.
The trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was well within its discretion to award

less than the attorney’s fees requested by the Appellants. In fact, the Appellants in their
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brief acknowledge that the trial court holds the “discretion” to award attorney’s fees.
(Appellants’ Brief at 4). Under Utah law, there is not any precise formula which defines
“reasonable” as it applies to attorney’s fees. The inquiry and determination of what
constitutes a reasonable award of attorney’s fees depends upon a number of factors which
include the amount in controversy, the extent of services rendered and other factors which
the trial court is in an advantaged position to judge. (Wallace v. Build, 402 P.2d 699, 701
(1965); see also, Record at 130).
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that the party requesting attorney’s fees
is required to categorize the time and fees expended for the successful claim for which
there may be an entitlement to reasonable attorney fees and the claims for which there is
no entitlement to attorneys fees. (See, Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101, ¶50 and Foote
v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998)).
The Trial Court concluded that under UCA §38-1-18 a “reasonable” attorney’s fee
should be awarded to the Appellants. (Record at 129). The Trial Court relied, in part, on
the premise that a “successful party includes one who successfully enforces or defends
against a lien action.” (Id., citing to Kurth v. Wiarda, 1999 UT App 335 ¶9). Trial courts
are afforded the discretion to take into account “the difficulty of the litigation, the
efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number of
hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the
amount involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the
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attorneys involved.” (Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1983); see also, Record
at 130).
In this present case, the Appellee pursued what it believed to be a rightful collection
of an unpaid account owed by the Appellants. It was the refusal of the Appellants to pay
any portion of this billing related to the subject countertops that resulted in the filing of the
mechanic’s lien and pursuit of collection. Appellee pursued in good faith what it believed
to be the amount due and owing; $2,182 from the Appellants. Appellants in this case did
prevail on their breach of contract claim and Appellee was not permitted to foreclose its
mechanic’s lien. The Trial Court specifically concluded that there was not any abuse of
lien or wrongful lien recorded by the Appellee.
The Appellants claimed to have expended more than one hundred five hours (105) hours
in handling the fight over the $2,182 claim. Considering the criteria prescribed by the Utah
Supreme Court, this expenditure of attorneys fees is excessive. The individual time entries reflect
in inordinate amount of time expended. For example, at the tail-end of the road of litigation, there
is a claim that approximately twenty (20) hours, $3800.00 in attorneys fees, were spent in
preparation for the 6-hour bench trial. Then after all of the twenty (20) hours of preparation for
trial and the six (6) hours in trial, it took an additional eight point eight hours (8.8) hours, $1,672
in attorneys fees, to prepare the proposed findings of facts; compared with the two point one (2.1)
hours, $409.50 of fees expended by Appellee for the preparation of its proposed findings of fact.
However, by the time that a case is prepared for trial, as part of the trail preparation trial notes are
made, the proposed findings that follow are merely a cleaning up and the editing of those trial
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notes. This certainly did not necessarily require near nine (9) hours to complete. (Record at 87,
100).
The Appellants’ Brief cites to only one legal authority; namely, Trayner v. Cushing, 688
P.2d 856 (Utah 1984). The Trial Court in the present case reviewed Trayner and noted in its
decision to reduce the attorney’s fees requested that Trayner stands for the expansion of the list of
factors that a trial court should consider in fashioning an award of attorney’s fees. (Record at
130). Trayner identifies factors such as “the relationship of the fee to the amount recovered, the
novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the overall result achieved and the necessity of
initiating a lawsuit to vindicate rights under the contract.” (Trayner at 858; Record at 130).
Moreover, the Trayner court states that a party is “entitled only to those fees attributable to the
successful vindication of contractual rights within the terms of their agreement.” (Id.)
In the instant case, the Trial Court considered the factors espoused by the applicable
caselaw in exercising its discretion to fashion an attorney’s fees award which was reasonable
under the circumstances and related to the claims on which Appellants actually prevailed; and not
related to those claims on which Appellants failed. (Record 129-133). The Trial Court did not
believe that there was any particular novelty or unusual difficulty involved in the present case. (Id
at 131). The Trial Court expressed that it has “serious reservations about the great disparity in the
relationship of the fee [requested] to the amount recovered [by the Appellants]... and about the
allocation of fees among those causes of action for which an attorney’s fee is recoverable and
those for which it is not.” (Id).
The Trial Court correctly agreed with the Appellee that Utah law requires that the trial
courts should allocate the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees among those claims for which it is

13

entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and those for which it is not. (Record at 85 and 131; see
also, Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. Co v. 51-SPR, LLC, 2006 UT App 353, ¶46, 144 P.3d 261;
Stonecreek Landscaping, LLC v. Bell, 2008 UT App 144 (unpublished)(noting the trial court
could have chosen not to award any fees when a party fails to separate its fees between matters on
which it was successful and unsuccessful). In the present case, the Trial Court found that the
Appellants failed to “differentiate between work done on the compensable mechanic’s lien claim
and the non-compensable abusive lien and contract-related claims.” (Record at 131). The Trial
Court held that it was neither reasonable nor equitable to require the Appellee to absorb much of
the cost associated with certain portions of the litigation. (Record at 132).

III.

APPELLANTS’ BRIEF FAILS TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGATIONS THAT
THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY AND/OR
INEQUITABLE.
Appellants provide mere opinions without any supporting legal authority.

Appellants argue that the failure to award them all of their attorney’s fees, despite the fact
that they failed to prevail on all of their causes of action, because it “denies litigants their
right to trial.” (Appellants’ Brief at 3). However, that statement is entirely unsupported
with legal authority. There is not any evidence or legal authority to support the
proposition that the Appellants have been “punished” or denied “their right to trial”.
There is not any evidence to support the argument that the Appellants have been denied
any due process, access to the courts or have been “punished”.
Appellants also argue that the present case “encourages reckless lien practices.”
(Appellants’ Brief at 4). However, there is nothing cited by Appellants to support this
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argument. It is noteworthy that Appellants failed to prevail on their abuse of lien cause of
action. (Record at 131). The Trial Court specifically found that the lien was not abusive
under UCA §38-1-25 and that the Appellee did not cause the lien to be filed with the intent
to cloud title, to exact more than it believed was due, or to get any unjustified advantage or
benefit. (Record at 80, ¶21).
Appellants then argue that the award of attorney’s fees in the present case was
“inequitable.” (Appellants’ Brief at 4). It is understandable and anticipated that most, if not all,
litigants who do not prevail on all of their causes of action are likely to feel that the judgment of
the trial court was inequitable. However, there is nothing in the present case on appeal to support
the claim of an inequitable remedy. Appellants argue that they had “no choice but litigate”. (Id
at 5). However, this is not accurate. This case was over the small amount of $2,182. (Record at
15). The Appellee’s project file indicated that the countertops which had been ordered by
Appellants, had been installed. (Record at 74, ¶61). The Trial Court found that the Appellee had
offered to resolve the disputed amount with a payment of $900; however, Appellants responded
by demanding the account be reduced to zero dollars and threatened to litigate. (Record at 72,
¶¶42-43, 61). It was the Appellants who elected to take formal depositions and spend 105 hours
of attorney time. (Record 87, 97-101).
Appellants litigated the case under the premise that they were going to ultimately prevail
on their abuse of lien cause of action and thereby stood to gain the entire amount of attorney’s
fees, costs and statutory damages. Nevertheless, it was the Appellee who successfully defended
against the abuse of lien cause of action. (Record at 131).

CONCLUSION
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The Appellants did not prevail at trial on their abuse of lien claims. The Appellants
were awarded attorney’s fees on their prevailing defense against the foreclosure of the
lien. The Trial Court considered the important and relevant factors in fashioning the
attorney’s fees award and acted well within its discretion in adjudicating the award of
attorney’s fees based upon the specific circumstances of the present case. Appellee is a bit
troubled by the formula applied by the Trial Court in fashioning the attorney’s fee award;
namely, awarding one-fourth of the fees based upon the fact that Appellants prevailed on
one of their four causes of action. Nevertheless, it does not appear that the Trial Court
abused its discretion in its application of the factors to be considered under Utah law with
respect to the award of attorney’s fees.
The arguments of the Appellants are based upon mere opinion of Dr. Bircoll that
the Trial Court acted inequitably, that the Appellants were denied access to the courts, and
that the judgment was against public policy. The Appellants’ positions on appeal lack
legal authority and persuasive argument.
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellee respectfully requests that the Appellants’
brief be dismissed or in the alternative, that the Order on Objection to Judgment and
Amended Judgment entered by the Trial Court be affirmed.
Dated this 3rd day of September, 2009.
Respectfully Submitted,
Farris & Utley, P.C.
__________________________________
Shawn T. Farris
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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